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The ability to propose legislation leads to an increased vote
share for politicians in subsequent elections.
It is generally accepted that constituents punish and reward their elected representatives at the
ballot box for their legislative actions. But there is surprisingly little research on the link between
politicians’ legislative activities and their chances of re-election. Using evidence from Canada, and
by controlling for other influences on election vote shares, Peter Loewen and Royce Koop find
that those MPs that are able to introduce legislation via private members (the ‘power to propose’)
bills do reap a small reward in their subsequent elections. 
Once elected, democratic representatives take a range of actions in their legislatures that may or
may not be popular with their constituents back home. A fairly uncontroversial notion in
democratic theory is that those constituents use re-elections as opportunities to either reward or
punish representatives for their legislative actions. Indeed, representative democracy makes little
sense if citizens’ don’t respond to their representatives’ behavior while in the legislature.
Despite the foundational and uncontroversial nature of this claim, the link between legislative
action and re-election outcomes has not in fact been demonstrated empirically. Indeed, political
scientists have found it difficult to demonstrate that citizens do use elections to reward or punish representatives
for their legislative actions. This is because observational studies cannot separate out the effects of legislative
actions versus other potential variables affecting re-election outcomes, such as their vote share in the last election
and whether or not they are a member of the governing party. What has been needed is a way to separate the
independent effects of legislative action on subsequent re-election outcomes.
In a recent study, we and our co-authors, Jaime Settle and James H. Fowler, harness a unique natural
experiment to demonstrate how legislative action affects subsequent electoral outcomes. Since 2004, the right of
non-cabinet members of the Canadian Parliament to introduce private members bills (PMBs) has been
determined randomly by lottery. MPs’ names are randomly selected at the commencement of each Parliament and
the order in which they are drawn forms the Order of Precedence, the order in which MPs are permitted to
introduce private members bills or motions in the Parliament. This element of randomness allows us to compare
the subsequent vote outcomes of both MPs who had the right to introduce a bill and those we were not afforded
such a right. This institutional characteristic of the Canadian parliament allows us to assess experimentally
whether one form of legislative action subsequently leads to enhanced vote shares. We demonstrate that being
provided with the right to introduce a single private members bill—known as being given the power to propose–
affords members of the governing party a substantial electoral advantage in subsequent re-election campaigns.
Credit: Kevin Konnyu (Creative Commons BY NC SA)
Our data is drawn from the 38th (2004-2006) and 39th (2006-2008) Canadian Parliaments, during which the
lottery system was in effect. MPs were placed in the treatment group if they had both the right and the opportunity
to introduce a PMB–the last MP included in treatment was lowest on the Order of Precedence but who
nevertheless had his bill read for a second time. In total we have 79 MPs in the treatment and 127 in the control
groups for the 38th and 86 MPs and 112 MPs in control for the 39th Parliament.
We hypothesize that, given the centrality and dominance of governments in the Canadian political system, being
afforded the power to propose will lead to increased vote shares for MPs in subsequent elections. To test this, we
examine vote share in previous election, membership in the governing party, the “power to propose” and an
interaction between governing party and proposal power. Figure 1 illustrates the result of t-tests (a statistical test to
determine if two sets of data are significantly different from each other) for the effect of proposal power on
subsequent vote shares. The raw estimate of the power to propose suggests an increase in government
members’ subsequent vote shares by 5.3 percent. There is no effect for opposition members.
Figure 1: Electoral vote share by government membership and assignation of right to propose legislation
Note: The results show that government
members who are granted the power to
propose earn a significantly greater voter
share than others
As there does appear to be some imbalance in our
data, we also estimated treatment effects in an
ordinary least squares regression framework. After
controlling for other variables, the effect of proposal
power is weakened to 2.7 percentage points, while
still differing from 0.
We next sought to explain why introducing
legislation positively affects MPs’ vote shares in
subsequent re-election campaigns by identifying
four potential mediators between legislative action
and their vote shares: media effects, quality
opponents, campaign resources, and candidate
popularity. We tested these hypotheses in a variety of ways and found no evidence supporting the first three: we
cannot show that the power to propose leads to more favourable media coverage, the dissuasion of quality
challengers in subsequent elections, and an increase in subsequent campaign resources. We do, however, find
evidence for the candidate popularity hypothesis: drawing on data from the Canada Election Study, we find that
government members holding the power to propose are named more often by their constituents as “individually
liked” more often than their counterparts lacking the power to propose (22.2 percent versus 15.8 percent).
This is the first study to demonstrate experimentally that what representatives do in their legislatures has an
independent effect on how they are subsequently regarded by voters. While our findings are consistent with the
commonly accepted notion of voters paying attention to their representatives’ legislative actions and responding
when provided with the opportunity, ours is the research to cleanly test whether this relationship is in fact a causal
one. Our results are intuitive but offer a much-needed confirmation of the widely held theory that voters hold
representatives accountable for their legislative action. Furthermore, that such an effect results from the
introduction of a single piece of legislation in as highly a centralized and party-dominated legislature as Canada’s
suggests that similar if not stronger effects will be found in other democratic systems, notably the U.S.
This article is based on the paper “A Natural Experiment in Proposal Power and Electoral Success,” which
appeared in the American Journal of Political Science. 
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